This paper presents a new approach to the Scope-licensing and Case-marking of direct objects under sentential negation in Russian. Adopting a modified version of Beghelli & Stowell (1997), I argue that scope is licensed in the syntax via a feature-matching mechanism. Accusative direct objects will be argued to have their Case valued in situ, i.e., vP-internally, via the operation Agree (as in Chomsky 1998, 1999), while ‘checking’ scope in a position external to vP, i.e., Spec RefP. I argue that genitive direct objects, on the other hand, have their Case valued in situ through NEG feature-matching with Neg⁰, while checking their scope feature in Spec NegP.

1. The data

This paper presents a new approach to an old problem in Russian syntax, namely, the problem of genitive Case-assignment to direct objects under sentential negation. In Russian, non-oblique VP-internal arguments can receive either genitive or accusative Case within the scope of negation, as shown in (1)-(3) below. ¹ ² ³

¹ For the sake of completeness, I have included the data in (2)-(3); however, I will not be discussing Genitive of negation (GN) on subjects of unaccusative or passive predicates. Presumably, whatever mechanism is responsible for GN case-licensing on direct objects is also responsible for GN on VP-internal subjects.

² Subjects of the existential verb byt’ ‘to be’ in Russian also undergo GN. However, unlike the examples in (1-3), these NPs obligatorily undergo GN. A thorough discussion of these examples is beyond the scope of this paper, although I will return to them briefly in Section 2.1. I refer the reader to Babyonyshev (1996) and Brown (1999) for recent discussion of these examples.

³ I will be using the following notation in glossing examples throughout this paper:

NOM = nominative, ACC=accusative, GEN=genitive, DAT=dative, INST=instrumental
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(1) Direct Objects of Transitives
   a. Anna ne kupil knigi.
      Anna-NOM NEG bought books-ACC
      ‘Anna did not buy the books.’
   b. Anna ne kupila knig.
      Anna-NOM NEG bought books-GEN
      ‘Anna didn’t buy any books.’

(2) Subjects of Unaccusatives
   a. Otveta ne prišlo.
      answer-GEN NEG came
      ‘No answer came.’
   b. Otvet ne prišel.
      answer-NOM NEG came.
      ‘The answer did not come.’

(3) Subjects of Passives (from Brown 1999)
   a. Ne bylo SROXþHQR gazet.
      NEG was received newspapers-GEN
      ‘No newspapers were received.’
   b. Gazeta ne byla SROXþHQD.
      newspaper-NOM NEG was received.
      ‘The newspaper was not received.’

For many years, the licensing of the Genitive of Negation (GN) on direct objects was viewed as an optional component of the grammar. However, with the development of Diesing’s (1992) Mapping Hypothesis, it became possible to account for the apparent semantic differences exhibited by GEN and ACC direct objects in the syntax. Note that in (1a) the ACC object knigi ‘books’ receives a definite or referential interpretation, whereas the GEN object knig ‘books’ neutrally receives an indefinite or existential interpretation. This pattern seems to hold in the general case of GN in Russian, i.e., GEN internal arguments tend to receive an indefinite or existential interpretation while NOM and ACC internal arguments receive a definite or referential interpretation. With respect to interpretation, these data resemble oft-quoted examples of object shift in various Germanic languages, where scrambled direct objects receive a non-existential interpretation, while in situ direct objects are interpreted existentially, as shown in (4) below.

(4) Object Shift in German (Diesing 1992:107-108)
   a. … [CP daß [IP Otto immer [VP Bücher über Wombats liest ]]]
      that Otto always books about wombats reads
      Always_{t} [t is a time] \exists x \text{ a book } \land \text{ Otto reads } x \text{ at } t
   b. … [CP daß [IP Otto Bücher über Womats immer [VP liest ]]]
      that Otto books about wombats always reads
      Always_{x} [x is a book] Otto reads x
In (4a), the direct object remains VP-internal at Spell-out, and the indefinite NP is interpreted as a variable, bound by Existential Closure. In (4b), however, the object has scrambled outside the VP and is bound by the adverb *immer* ‘always’. Thus, while the interpretation of direct objects in German is determined based on their hierarchical position within the clause, in Russian, the interpretation of direct objects under negation is determined, in large part, by Case-marking.

In this paper, I will point out various problems associated with previous analyses of the Genitive of Negation in Russian. I will suggest a new analysis to account for the interpretation of genitive and accusative direct objects, casting doubt on analyses which treat the genitive-accusative alternation in Russian as support for either Diesing’s Mapping Hypothesis or for approaches which treat GN as the result of case-licensing by a null quantifier that functions as a Negative Polarity Item. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I discuss two recent proposals concerning GN, pointing out where each analysis fails to account for certain key points of data. In Section 3, I present my proposal, relying on Beghelli & Stowell’s (1997) analysis of Scope-checking in the Syntax. Here, I argue that genitive direct objects in Russian have both their Case and Scope features valued through NEG feature agreement with Neg\(_0\). Accusative NPs, on the other hand, will be argued to have their Case valued vP-internally, i.e., in situ, via the operation Agree, in accordance with recent minimalist proposals in Chomsky (1998, 1999). However, I argue that when these accusative NPs are referential or presuppositional, getting their reference independently, they must raise to a scope position that c-commands the rest of the clause. The interpretations of accusative and genitive NPs will then fall out from positions within feature-matching chains, without recourse to Diesing’s Mapping Hypothesis. This analysis will also differ from Hornstein’s (1995) proposal, which states that scope is determined based on Case-checking chains alone. If my assumptions about the clause structure and Case-licensing properties of Russian turn out to be correct, then it will be clear that Hornstein’s approach to scope cannot be accurate. I now move to a discussion of two recent proposals concerning GN in Russian: Pereltsvaig (1999) and Brown (1999).

2. Previous analyses
2.1. Pereltsvaig (1999)

Pereltsvaig (1999) takes Pesetsky’s (1982) analysis of GN as her starting point, assuming that a null quantifier is responsible for assigning genitive to internal arguments under sentential negation. She argues that this null quantifier is a strict Negative Polarity Item (NPI), both syntactically and semantically,
licensed solely by sentential negation. She proposes a constraint on GN that she
refers to as the Referentiality Constraint.

(5) The Referentiality Constraint
   (Pereltsvaig 1999:18)
   If the object participant is referential, it cannot be quantified over by $q$.
   Thus, it cannot be assigned Genitive and is instead assigned Accusative.

It is true, in general, that referential NPs cannot receive genitive case under
negation. Babayonyshev (1996:145) discusses this constraint as well, giving the
examples in (6) below.\(^5\)

(6) a. Vanja ne pročital Vojnu i Mir.
    Vanya NEG read War and Peace-ACC
    ‘Vanya didn’t read *War and Peace.*’

b. *Vanja ne pročital Vojny i Mira.
    Vanya NEG read War and Peace-GEN

However, if Pereltsvaig’s (1999) analysis of GN is correct, and a null quantifier
$q$ is responsible for assigning Genitive case under negation, then it is unclear
why examples such as (7a) should be allowed at all.

(7) a. Maši ne bylo doma.
    Maša GEN NEG was home
    ‘Maša wasn’t home.’

b. *Maša ne byla doma.\(^6\)
    Maša NOM NEG was home

\(^5\) Pereltsvaig (1999:25) notes that there are counterexamples to her referentiality constraint, citing the examples in (i) below.

(i) a. Ja ne vížu mamu.  b. Ja ne vížu mamy.
    I NEG see mama-ACC  I NEG see mama-GEN
    ‘I don’t see mother.’  ‘I can’t see mother.’

She claims that in (ib), GN gives rise to a modal (possibility) reading. Thus, she argues that the null quantifier $q$ quantifies over the instantiations of ‘mother’ in all possible worlds, as opposed to
quantifying over ‘mother’. Pereltsvaig argues that all of these apparent counterexamples to her
Referentiality Constraint contain perception verbs, which have been argued to be inherently
ambiguous between an actual-perception reading and a possibility-reading. Therefore, these
examples may not be true counterexamples, given the semantics of the verbs themselves. However,
Yahor Tsedryk (p.c.) points out that examples such as (ii) are perfectly acceptable for him as well.

(ii) Ja ne našel Maši / Mašu.
    I NEG found Masha-GEN/ACC
    ‘I didn’t find Masha.’

It is unclear whether speakers who accept the GEN-ACC alternation in (ii) feel the same semantic
distinction as in (i) above. I set these examples aside as a puzzle for the moment, leaving them for
further investigation.

\(^6\) Note that (7b) is in fact grammatical under a contrastive-focus reading on doma ‘at home.’ All
the native speakers I consulted on this example indicated that the sentence feels ‘unfinished’ to
them, i.e., they expect the speaker to tell them where Maša actually was: Maša ne byla doma a u
menja ‘Maša-NOM wasn’t at home but at my place.’ This seems to indicate that constituent
negation is involved here, rather than sentential negation. Thus, it is no surprise that GN is not
licensed.
In Russian, GN is *obligatory* on subjects of the existential verb *byt’* ‘to be’, regardless of their in/definiteness, i.e., the Referentiality Constraint does not hold here. Presumably, whatever mechanism is responsible for licensing GN on direct objects should also be responsible for GN on subjects of BE in Russian. Thus, Pereltsvaig’s proposal for GN Case-licensing must be restricted to cases of direct objects alone, when, ideally, we would like to propose a single mechanism to account for all cases of GN.

Furthermore, it is not clear that Pereltsvaig’s null quantifier q should be treated as an NPI in Russian, although, at first blush, this appears to be the case. It is true that GN is licensed solely in contexts of clausemate sentential negation, as are strict NPIs in Russian. For example, negative polarity items such as *nikto* ‘nobody’ and *nikogda* ‘never’, i.e., *ni*Ps, in Russian are licensed solely by clausemate negation, patterning with GN. This is shown in (8).

(8) a. **Nikto nikogda ne čtaet gazet-y/-Ø.**
   'No one ever reads newspapers.'
   b. *Ja ne skazala, čto nikto nikogda čtaet gazet-y/*-Ø.
   'I didn’t say that no one ever reads newspapers.'

However, there is, in fact, one syntactic environment where GN *is* licensed and strict NPIs in Russian are not. These are cases of so-called ‘pleonastic’ or ‘expletive’ negation. Roughly stated, pleonastic negation is a context where negation is licensed in the syntax without yielding a negative interpretation in the semantics. Thus, sentences with pleonastic negation do not carry any negative meaning themselves. Cross-linguistically, pleonastic negation is quite common, with various syntactic or lexical factors contributing to the licensing of this construction. In English, for example, expletive negation is frequently found in exclamatives, as in (9), while in Polish, pleonastic negation is licensed in concessive conditionals, shown in (10). Russian examples are given in (11).

(9) Who doesn’t like chocolate?! (=Everyone likes chocolate)
(10) Polish concessive conditional (from Citko 2000:156)
    Co by się *nie* stalo, pojedziemy jutro na plażę.
    'Whatever happens, we will go to the beach tomorrow.'
(11) Pleonastic/Expletive Negation in Russian (from Brown 1999:96-97)
    a. **Ne dopustil li kto-nibud’/ *nikto* ošibki?**
       NEG allow Q who-any / no-who mistake-GEN
       ‘Could someone have made a mistake?’

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7 Unfortunately, due to space limitations, I am unable to discuss these examples further. While I am convinced that a single Case-licensing mechanism is responsible for GN on both copular subjects and direct objects, something additional clearly needs to be said about the distribution of GN here.

8 To my knowledge, Brown & Franks (1995) first pointed this out about Russian.
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b. ...poka ne poluču vašego kakogo-nibud’/ *nikakogo otveta.
   until NEG receive your /which-any / no-which answer-GEN
   ‘...until I receive your/some/*no answer’

Note that in the Russian examples in (11), GN is licensed on the direct object in each example, despite the fact that nPs, i.e., strict NPIs in Russian, are not. These examples cast serious doubt on Pereltsvaig’s (1999) analysis of GN as a strict NPI. Therefore, I will assume that this is not the correct analysis for GN in Russian. I now move on to Brown’s (1999) analysis of GN, which differs greatly from Pereltsvaig’s proposal.

2.2. Brown (1999)

Brown (1999) adopts a strictly minimalist feature-checking analysis to explain the distribution of GN in Russian. She argues that GN is a structural case in Russian, and that all genitive NPs raise to the Spec of NegP, either overtly or covertly, to check their case feature. In contrast, she argues that accusative direct objects will raise to the Spec of an Aspect Phrase (AspP) to check their case, again, either covertly or overtly. Similar to previous analyses of GN in Russian (such as Babyonyshev 1996 and Bailyn 1997), Brown adopts Diesing’s (1992) Mapping Hypothesis to explain the interpretation of accusative and genitive direct objects in Russian. She argues that genitive direct objects will always have an existential interpretation because they do not escape the domain of existential closure. Under Diesing’s original proposal, the domain of existential closure was defined as the VP. However, Brown (1999) argues that under negation, the domain of existential closure is extended to include NegP. She refers to this extended domain as the ‘Domain of Negative Closure of Events’. The clause structure she proposes is shown in (12).

(12)  TP
      /   /
      /   /
      T   AspP
         /
         Asp
     /     /
     /     /
     NegP
        /   /
        /   /
        Neg  PredP
           /   /
           /   /
           Pred  VP

Given Brown’s assumptions about the clause structure of Russian, the implementation of her proposal is clear. She argues that since accusative direct objects check their Case in a position external to the domain of negative closure of events, i.e., Spec AspP, they can receive a presuppositional or referential interpretation. However, since the tail of their chain lies within this domain, accusative NPs can also be interpreted existentially. In contrast, genitive NPs...
will be obligatorily existential, given that their Case-checking chain falls entirely within the domain of negative closure of events.

There are several reasons to reject this analysis. First, the clause structure Brown proposes for Russian is unmotivated given what we know about verbs and aspect in Russian. While there have been a great deal of independently motivated reasons for positing an Aspect Phrase in the syntax (see, in particular, Schoorlemmer 1996), it is unclear that its position in Russian should c-command NegP. Note the examples in (13) below.

(13) a. Ja ne začita i  ž u nikakogo spiska imen.
   I NEG read-aloud-PERF 1SG no list-GEN names
   ‘I will not read any list of names aloud.’

b. Ja ne začityva i  ž u nikakogo spiska imen.
   I NEG read-aloud-IMPF 1SG no list-GEN names
   ‘I am not reading any list of names aloud.’

c. Ja ne budu začityva i  ž u nikakogo spiska imen.
   I NEG will-1SG read-aloud-IMPF INF no list-GEN names
   ‘I will not be reading any list of names aloud.’

d. *Ja budu ne začityva i  ž u nikakogo spiska imen.
   I will-1SG NEG read-aloud-IMPF INF no list-GEN names

In (13a) we have the perfective verb začit a i  ž u ‘to read aloud’. In (13b) we see its derived imperfective counterpart, formed with the imperfectivizing infix -yvaj-, indicating that aspect is a verbal affix in Russian. Finally, in (13c), the periphrastic future tense is created with the auxiliary byt ’ to be’. Note here that aspect is still an infix on the main verb; it is not realized on the auxiliary. The reason for including these examples in the current discussion is to try to pinpoint the syntactic location of AspP, with respect to NegP. Consider the structures in (14) below.

(14) a. * TP
   T
   AuxP
   Aux
   AspP
   NegP
   Neg
   VP

   b. TP
   T
   NegP
   AuxP
   Aux
   AspP
   NegP
   Asp
   VP

If the head of AspP were to c-command negation, as in (14a), we might expect the word order in (13d), as opposed to the order in (13c). If Aspect were to come between the auxiliary verb budu ‘I-will’ and the negation marker ne, we might not expect negation to procliticize to the auxiliary, but rather, to the main verb itself (under the assumption that proclitics ‘look right’ in the linear string for something to attach themselves to). Alternatively, we might expect Neg’ to
prevent the verb from raising to Asp, in order to combine with its imperfectivizing suffix –yvaj- (or features thereof) due to a Relativized Minimality effect. Therefore, contrary to the claim made by Brown, I argue that NegP dominates both the Aspect Phrase and the Auxiliary Phrase in the syntax.9

Further evidence for abandoning an account that relies on the domain of existential closure comes from (15) below (formerly (2a) above).

(15) Otveta ne prišlo.
answer-GEN NEG came
‘No answer came.’

Any analysis of GN which relies solely on Diesing’s Mapping Hypothesis for an explanation of the interpretation of genitive NPs will have to account for the fact that in (15) the genitive NP Otveta ‘answer’ has raised from its VP-internal position under neutral discourse, presumably to satisfy the EPP in Spec TP.10 Yet, note that this NP still receives an existential interpretation. Under Brown’s proposal, this NP would obligatorily receive a presuppositional interpretation, yet we see from the gloss that this is clearly not the case. Therefore, based on the evidence in (15), we have further motivation for abandoning Brown’s analysis as a complete explanation for the facts.

3. The Proposal

I will now argue for an analysis of GN in Russian that makes use of the independently motivated Scope-checking mechanism argued for in Beghelli & Stowell (1997). Beghelli & Stowell (B&S) make two central assumptions in their theory of scope. First, they assume that quantifier scope is determined by c-command relations holding at LF. Second, they assume that Quantifier

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9 It is, of course, possible that there is no AuxP in the syntactic structure. In this case, I assume that the auxiliary is instead located in the head of TP. Regardless of the location of the auxiliary in the functional clause structure, the issue remains as to why negation would cliticize to the auxiliary as opposed to the main verb itself, if the structure is as Brown (1999) proposes, i.e., (14a). Thus, my argument against her analysis still holds.

10 Here I follow Lavine (2000) who convincingly argues that the EPP is best viewed as an independent, uninterpretable feature of the clause, capable of motivating syntactic movement in the absence of either nominative Case or agreement. Evidence from Russian is found in numerous examples of so-called ‘Adversity Impersonals’, as in (i) below (see Babby 1994 for further discussion of this construction).

(i) Russian Adversity Impersonal (from Lavine 2000:24)

Ženěčkůně zadavilo tři kovrom-samoletom v parke Gor’kogo.

woman-ACC crushed [-AGR] carpet-airplane-INST in park of-Gorky

‘A woman was crushed by the flying carpet [attraction] in Gorky Park.’

Lavine points out that Ženěčkůně ‘woman’ is interpreted as an indefinite NP under neutral discourse, despite the fact that it has raised overtly from its VP-internal position. Note that neither its ACC Case feature nor its lack of agreement with the verb prevents it from raising to TP to satisfy the EPP. This same pattern is exhibited by (15) above.
Phrases (QPs) are assigned scope by undergoing movement to their scope positions in the derivation of LF representations. Where B&S depart from previous analyses of QR, such as May (1985) and Aoun & Li (1993), is in their rejection of the uniformity of quantifier scope assignment. That is, they deny that QR applies uniformly to all QP types. Rather, each type of QP is associated with its own unique scope position in the functional clause structure. Based on data primarily from English, they argue for the functional clause structure in (16) below.

(16) Functional Clause Structure (Beghelli & Stowell 1997:76)\textsuperscript{11}

\[\begin{array}{c}
\text{RefP} \\
[+GQP] \quad \text{CP} \\
[+WH] \quad \text{TP} \\
[+NOM] \quad \text{DistP} \\
[+DQP] \quad \text{ShareP CP} \\
[+GQP] \quad \text{NegP} \\
[+NQP] \quad \text{vP} \\
[+ACC] \quad \text{VP}
\end{array}\]

For the purposes of this paper, I will focus primarily on the projections RefP and NegP, where RefP stand for “Referential” Phrase. B&S argue that movement of various quantified expressions to their scope positions is driven by the need to check features that are associated with their QP types. So, for example, QPs that are referentially independent will normally occupy Spec RefP at LF, where they might fulfill the function of logical subject of predication or topic, and are interpreted with widest scope relative to other scope-bearing elements in their clause. I argue that they raise to check a [+REF] Scope-feature against an existential operator head, Ref\textsubscript{0}, at LF. Negative Quantifier Phrase (NQPs), on the other hand, will check their [+NEG] feature against the head of NegP. These two functional categories, i.e., RefP and NegP, will play a crucial role in my analysis.

\textsuperscript{11} I have adapted their structure slightly, substituting TP for AgrSP and vP for AgrOP.
3.2. Accounting for the Referentiality Constraint

Adopting Beghelli & Stowell’s (1997) proposal allows us to explain several mysterious facts about the distribution of GN in Russian. Recall Pereltsvaig’s (1999) Referentiality Constraint from Section 2.1, which states that only accusative Case is licensed on referential direct objects under sentential negation (see 17 below).

(17)  
   a. Mama ne bila Annu.  
       Mama NEG beat Anna-ACC  
       ‘Mama didn’t beat Anna.’  
   b. *Mama ne bila Anny.  
       Mama NEG beat Anna-GEN

I argue here that Beghelli & Stowell’s proposal allows us to account for the Referentiality Constraint without recourse to either the null quantifier analysis of Pereltsvaig (1999) or to Brown’s (1999) analysis, which relies solely on the domain of existential closure for the interpretation of NPs. Let us first consider the grammatical sentence in (17a) above, represented by the structure in (18).\[12\]

In (18) I assume that the ACC direct object Annu has its case valued \textit{in situ} via the feature-matching mechanism proposed in Chomsky (1998, 1999), i.e.,

\[12\] For all syntactic structures henceforth, lexical items in \textbf{bold} are Spell-Out positions; items in \textit{italics} are scope positions; and items in (parentheses) are copies of movement.
Agree.\textsuperscript{13} Here, Agree holds between the probe $V_{\text{COMP}}$ \textit{bila} ‘beat’ and the goal \textit{Annu}, deleting the $\phi$-set of $V$ and the ACC Case feature on \textit{Annu}.\textsuperscript{14} I will further assume that structural ACC case in Russian carries inherent existential presupposition, in contrast to GEN, which does not.\textsuperscript{15} Leaving aside questions about intermediate stages of successive cyclic movement, I argue that \textit{Annu} raises further, i.e., covertly, to have its [+REF] feature valued by the head of RefP, presumably via the same feature-matching mechanism discussed earlier for Case, i.e., Agree.\textsuperscript{16} However, unlike the uninterpretable features involved with Case-matching, we may assume that Scope features are interpretable, and, therefore, will not delete through matching.

Having accounted for the felicitous sentence in (17a), we are now left with (17b). What rules out GN on the direct object here? (See 19 below.)

\begin{equation}
\begin{cases}
\text{* Derivation cancels} \\
\quad [+\text{NQP}] \text{feature on Neg}^0 \text{ clashes with [+REF] feature on DO}
\end{cases}
\end{equation}

In (19), I argue that the genitive direct object \textit{Anny} has its case valued \textit{in situ} via NEG feature-matching with the probe Neg$^0$.\textsuperscript{17} I argue that GN is licensed on the direct object, in part, as a result of a $\phi$-incomplete V, i.e., a \textbf{defective} V that has no object agreement feature. In the lack of this agreement feature, ACC cannot be valued. Therefore, the goal, i.e., the direct object, must locate another

\textsuperscript{13} I adopt Chomsky’s (1998) feature-matching mechanism here precisely because it allows for deletion of case features \textit{in situ}. I would argue that there is no evidence for case-driven NP-raising in Russian. See Harves & Lavine (1998) for further argumentation.

\textsuperscript{14} Where $V_{\text{COMP}}$ stands for a $\phi$-complete V. Note here that I depart slightly from Chomsky (1999) in assuming that it is $V_{\text{COMP}}$ which is necessary for valuing ACC case, rather than $V_{\text{COMP}}$.

\textsuperscript{15} This claim will become important to my analysis in Section 3.4.

\textsuperscript{16} The status of $A'$-movement within Chomsky (1999) remains unclear. However, it does not seem unreasonable to extend all instances of feature-valuing to the Agree(ment) mechanism proposed in Chomsky (1999). This is a larger issue that is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.

\textsuperscript{17} I follow Brown (1999) in assuming that GN is licensed by Neg$^0$. 
probe in order to have its Case valued. The closest probe is then Neg\(^0\). However, I argue that once Anny enters into an agreement relation with Neg\(^0\), any other remaining features that can potentially match those of the probe, must do so. In this example, the direct object Anny not only carries a GEN Case-feature but also a [+REF] scope feature, given that Anna is a referentially independent NP. The derivation will cancel, as a result of the fact that the [+REF] feature on the direct object will clash with the [+NQP] feature on the head of Neg\(^0\). Therefore, a referential direct object in Russian cannot receive genitive Case under sentential negation due to a mismatch in scope features. In essence, we have just derived Pereltsvaig’s (1999) Referentiality Constraint from the syntax, without recourse to a null quantifier.

3.3. The scope of genitive NPs

Having examined two scenarios involving referential NPs in 3.2. above, we now turn to a discussion of non-referential direct objects under negation in Russian. As asserted throughout this paper, genitive direct objects tend to receive an existential or indefinite interpretation, while accusative direct objects receive either a referential or definite interpretation. I would like to suggest that there are at least two ways for a genitive direct object in Russian to have its scope licensed: (1) via feature-matching with a [+NQP] feature in Neg\(^0\) or (2) in situ, where it enters into no Scope-matching relations at all but, rather, is simply interpreted as a variable, bound by an existential operator à la Heim (1982). Hence, it is important to understand that not all NPs raise for Scope-checking. Therefore, not all NPs will enter into Scope-matching relations. We will first consider option (1), where Scope-licensing occurs in Spec NegP. Consider example (20).

(20) Anna ne kupila nikakix knig.
    ‘Anna didn’t buy any books.’

In (20), the direct object nikakix knig receives genitive Case under negation. At least two questions must be addressed with respect to this example: (i) How is GN licensed? (ii) How does the direct object have its Scope licensed? Note that the direct object remains in situ at Spell-Out, indicating that no overt movement of the direct object has occurred, either for Case or Scope. Therefore, as stated earlier, I assume that genitive Case is valued and subsequently deleted in situ, via [+NEG] feature-matching. However, at LF, the NP must raise to value its Scope feature in Spec NegP. Therefore, the genitive NP will have both its GN Case-feature as well as its [+NQP] scope feature valued through features of Neg\(^0\). This is shown in (21).
Let us now turn to the case where a non-referential NP is non-quantificational and interpreted as a variable, despite the fact that it is genitive and not accusative. I argue that such an instance occurs in cases of pleonastic negation, as discussed in Section 2.1. Recall our example from (11a), repeated below as (22) (from Brown 1999:96).

(22) Ne dopustil li kto-nibud’/ *nikto ošibki?
    NEG allow Q who-any / no-who mistake-GEN
    ‘Could someone have made a mistake?’

In the presence of pleonastic negation, GN is licensed in Russian while NPIs are not. In (22), GN is licensed on the direct object ošibki ‘answer’, while the NPI nikto ‘nobody’ is not. As indicated by the gloss, no negative quantificational force is felt to hold in this sentence. I would now like to suggest that the reason no negative force is present in the semantics is due to the absence of the [+NQP] feature found in canonical cases of sentential negation. Here, I follow Brown (1999) in assuming that Neg\(^0\) carries more than a single feature. I argue that while a [+NEG] feature is responsible for licensing GN in Russian, a different feature is responsible for licensing NPIs. Following B&S (1997), I have argued that Neg\(^0\) carries a Scope feature, i.e., [+NQP], and I would now like to claim that this Scope feature is necessary for licensing NPIs in Russian. Hence, I argue that its absence results in the non-licensing of NPIs. We might liken Neg’s lack of an [+NQP] feature to the way in which defective V is unable to license ACC Case, i.e., defective Neg is unable to license NPIs.

A further consequence of this proposal is that genitive direct objects in contexts of pleonastic negation will not undergo Scope-matching with a [+NQP] feature in Neg\(^0\). Therefore, when these NPs are interpreted as indefinites, I argue that they are interpreted as variables, bound by a null existential operator à la Heim (1982).

\(^{18}\) In essence, my argument here is the same as Brown’s. Where we differ is in our feature-labels. Brown (1999) argues that GN is licensed by the feature [POL] (polarity), while NPIs are licensed by both [POL] and [NEG]. She claims that in cases of pleonastic negation, there is no [NEG] feature present, but rather, only a [POL] feature. Thus, she argues that GN is licensed here while NPIs are not. While it is clear that cases of pleonastic or expletive negation do not result in negative semantics in the final denotation of the sentence, it remains unclear as to whether these sentences should be viewed as lacking a [NEG] feature altogether, or whether other syntactic or semantic factors simply obscure its effect (see Haspelmath 1997 and Horn 1989 for two opposing views). Both of these views are found widely in the literature on negation, and I will not attempt to summarize them here. I will assume for the time being, however, that a [NEG] feature is present.
Finally, I would like to offer an explanation for an additional set of data that has puzzled linguists for decades, namely, the lack of accusative niPs (strict NPIs) in Russian. One example is given in (23) below.

(23) a. *Ja ne polučil ni odno pis’mo. (Pesetsky 1982:215)  
I NEG received not one letter-ACC  
‘I didn’t receive a single letter.’

b. Ja ne polučil ni odnogo pis’ma.  
I NEG received not one letter-GEN  
‘I didn’t receive a single letter.’

In Russian, ni ‘not’ is an emphatic particle which seems to indicate that the word or phrase to which it attaches lacks reference completely, thereby intensifying negation. It may prefix virtually any NP in the context of sentential negation, provided the NP is not accusative. For example, the sentences in (24) are all perfectly grammatical utterances in Russian.

(24) a. Ni odin student ne spal. (ni+NOM)  
not one student-NOM NEG slept  
‘Not a single student slept.’

b. Ja ni odnomu mal’čiku ne dal jabloko. (ni+DAT)  
I not one boy-DAT NEG gave apple  
‘I didn’t give a single boy the apple.’

c. On nikogda ne rukovodil ni odnim proektom (ni + INST)  
he never NEG led not one project-INST  
‘He never led a single project.’

It has remained a mystery why accusative niPs are so strongly dispreferred in Russian, as in (23a). I would like to suggest that the analysis of Scope-matching presented here can account for this gap in the paradigm. Recall the claim from Section 3.2., which states that accusative Case in Russian carries inherent existential presupposition. Assuming this is correct, we have a ready explanation for the lack of accusative niPs in Russian. I have argued that niPs must raise to Spec NegP to have their [+NQP] feature valued. If an accusative niP raises through NegP, either overtly or covertly, its existential presupposition will clash with the features of Neg, causing the derivation to cancel. This is reminiscent of the feature-mismatch discussed earlier for referential genitive NPs, which are similarly disallowed in Russian. Thus, adopting a somewhat modified version of B&S’s (1997) system of syntactic Scope-checking allows us not only to account for the interpretation and distribution of genitive direct objects in Russian, but also to rule out those cases which are categorically excluded from the grammar.

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