

Full partitives, bare partitives and non-maximal definites

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In this paper I investigate the restrictions on the use of bare partitives in Dutch. My main claim is that these restrictions originate in the competition of bare partitives with full partitives and non-maximal definites.

1. Introduction

1.1. Topic and aim

The topic of this paper are bare partitives in Dutch (see de Hoop, Vanden Wyngaerd & Zwart 1991; Hoeksema 1996; Oosterhof 2005a,b; Le Bruyn 2007a). Bare partitives are expressions of the form *of + definite determiner + Noun* and are different from full partitives like *two of the boys* in having no quantifier in front of *of*. An example of their use is given in (1):

(1) [When Aunt got ill Floddertje decided to make a nice pot of soup. She soon noticed that the soup got lumpy and saw no other solution than to take the mixer. You can imagine the consequences... Indeed : the soup got spread all over Aunt's kitchen and covered the nice white walls.]

Ondanks alle moeite die Floddertje deed om het geklieder op te kuisen
Despite all effort that Floddertje did to the mess up to clean
vond tante weken later nog steeds **van die soep** in alle hoeken van de
found aunt weeks later still still of that soup in all corners of the
keuken.
kitchen

'Despite all the effort Floddertje put into cleaning up the mess Aunt weeks later still found some of that soup in all corners of the kitchen.'¹

The above example was presented to Dutch and Belgian speakers of Dutch who almost unanimously agreed on its acceptability. The amount of context is not gratuitous though, bare partitives are only acceptable under very restricted conditions. This paper aims at uncovering these.

¹ I translated *van die soep* as *some that soup* to obtain an acceptable English translation. Note though that quantity is in fact underspecified.

1.2. Hypothesis

The hypothesis I defend is that the restrictions on the use of bare partitives originate in their competition with other expressions. The underlying idea is that speakers select among closely related expressions the one that conveys best the meaning they want to express. From this perspective, uncovering the conditions on the use of bare partitives consists in evaluating which meanings bare partitives express better than other similar expressions. The set of expressions I propose to compare are those that allow to refer to parts of the denotation of a definite DP. Next to bare partitives this set contains full partitives and non-maximal definites. I will refer to this set as the competition set.

1.3. Overview

The core of the paper consists of five sections. Sections 2 through 4 are devoted to a discussion of the basic meaning of non-maximal definites, full partitives and bare partitives respectively. They also gradually build up the competition account that is further elaborated in section 5. Section 6 checks the predictions the analysis makes for bare partitives.

Note that for ease of exposition most examples concerning full partitives and non-maximal definites will be given in English. Whatever applies to English for these expressions applies to Dutch too.

2. Non-maximal definites

Definites are standardly associated with a maximality operator. *The boys* e.g. refers to all the boys in a model. It has however been pointed out that definites needn't always refer maximally. A paradigmatic example is (2):

(2) The boys constructed the raft.

There is consensus that (2) can be true even if not all the boys in the model actively contributed to the construction of the raft. This is known as the non-maximal reading of definites (Brisson 1998). Definite DPs then allow to refer to both proper and improper parts of the referent of a definite DP and therefore belong in our competition set. This section tries to establish how the non-maximal reading comes about, proposes a formal analysis and concludes with an assessment of the role non-maximal definites play in our competition set.

2.1. The origin of non-maximality

To account for the non-maximality reading of definites two hypotheses are available. According to the first non-maximality is nothing more than a sloppy maximal reading. According to the second definites should be interpreted as 'close to all N'. It is the first hypothesis that is standard in the literature but to my knowledge no (linguistic) arguments have been presented against the second. This subsection discusses one which is based on Nouwen (2003).

Nouwen (2003) investigates the possibilities of anaphoric reference of pronouns. Standard is their ability to pick up the referent of a plural DP. This is known as reference to the reference set (REFset) of the DP.

(3) Few MPs came. – **They** decided not to discuss anything important.

(4) Most MPs came. – **They** made a lot of important decisions.

Less well-known is the ability of plural pronouns in (5) to refer to the MPs that didn't come and their inability to do this in (6). This is known as reference to the complement set (COMPset) of the DP.

(5) Few MPs came. – **They** stayed home instead.

(6) Most MPs came. – #**They** went to the beach instead.

The origin of this contrast is not important for our present purposes. What is important is that COMPset reference is generally available when the anaphor involves explicit reference to the COMPset:

(7) Most MPs came. – **The others** went to the beach instead.

(8) Most MPs came. – **The rest of them** went to the beach instead.

This last fact offers us a simple argument against the hypothesis according to which the non-maximality of definites originates in a 'close to all N' interpretation. The argument goes as follows: if definites were really interpreted as 'close to all N' we would expect them to have a COMPset and for COMPset reference to be possible with 'the others' or 'the rest of them'. As can easily be verified this is contrary to fact:

(9) The MPs came. – #**The others** went to the beach instead.

(10) The MPs came. – #**The rest of them** went to the beach instead.

From the above I conclude that non-maximal readings are sloppy maximal readings and not proper partitive readings.

Before presenting an analysis that accounts for non-maximal readings of definites I would like to make a small digression. It concerns verbs that prohibit REFset reference to their definite DP object under certain conditions. Examples are given in (11) and (12):

(11) I ate the cakes today. – # I'll eat **them** again tomorrow.

(12) I sold the cakes today. – # I'll sell **them** again tomorrow.

The reason why verbs like *eat* and *sell* – consumption and transaction verbs – don't allow for the continuations in (11) and (12) is that they entail that their subject can perform the verb-action on the object only once. I coin this property the *once-only* property and propose the following formal definition of *once-only* verbs:

$$(13) \forall R(\text{Once-Only}(R) \leftrightarrow \forall e, x, y, e' (R(e, x, y) \& R(e', x, y) \rightarrow e = e'))$$

This definition states that whenever there are two events that involve a once-only verb, the same subject and the same object the two events are necessarily identical. For consumption verbs we can furthermore leave out the subject condition:

$$(14) \forall R(\text{Once-Only}(R) \leftrightarrow \forall e, x, x', y, e' (R(e, x, y) \& R(e', x', y) \rightarrow e = e'))$$

I close this digression here but once-only verbs will be picked up again in section 6.

2.2. Analysis

The way I propose to formalize that non-maximal readings of definites are sloppy maximal readings is to use the concept of *cover* (see Brisson 1998). A cover C is a set of subsets of the domain that is such that every individual in the domain belongs to (at least) one subset of C and that the empty set is not in C . For a domain with three boys (a,b,c) (15) lists some of the possible covers:

- (15) i. $\{\{a\}, \{b\}, \{c\}\}$
 ii. $\{\{a, b\}, \{c\}\}$
 iii. $\{\{a\}, \{b, c\}\}$
 iv. $\{\{a, b, c\}\}$
 v. $\{\{a, c\}, \{b\}\}$

If we now assume that *the* is contextually interpreted as in (16), cover (ii) gives us a reading according to which *I saw the boys today* is true even if I only saw boys *a* and *b*.

$$(16) \iota \lambda x \exists y (\text{Plural}(x) \& x \in y \& y \in \text{COV} \& y \subseteq \text{BOYS})$$

Informally this analysis creates a ‘junk pile’ of individuals that are simply not taken into account when evaluating the truth of a sentence containing a non-maximal definite (see Brisson 1998). This is exactly what a sloppy interpretation of maximality amounts to.

There is one question concerning the above analysis that I cannot answer, *viz.* how sloppy definites can get. The problem with this question lies in the fact that the sloppiness of definites can only be measured if we assume that the speaker knows how many N are in the model. Given that there is no reason to assume this the question how sloppy definites can get can simply not be answered without extra assumptions (this in contrast to the sloppiness of e.g. ‘1000 kilometers’ discussed by Krifka 2001). Hopefully I will have the opportunity to work out these extra assumptions in future research but for the moment I will simply assume that there is no limit on the sloppiness of definites.

2.3. Non-maximal definites and the competition set

In this section I defended the view that the non-maximality of definites originates in sloppy maximality. The question I will be concerned with in this concluding subsection is what this means for the position of non-maximal definites within our competition set. To do this I need to distinguish between two kinds of partitive relations. The first is proper partitivity:

(17) x is a proper part of y if x is part of but not identical to y (\prec)

In a model with three men a proper part of the men contains at most two men. The second is improper partitivity:

(18) x is an improper part of y if x is part of and can be identical to y (\leq).

In a model with three men an improper part of the men can contain up to three men. Note that if x is a proper part of y it is automatically an improper part of y too. The inverse does not apply. It follows that the improper part relation is more general than the proper part relation.

On the basis of the fact that non-maximal definites are in origin maximal I claim that they are extremely fit to encode the improper part relation. Indeed, despite the fact that non-maximal definites can refer to parts of the referent of a definite DP they don't allow for COMPset reference. Put differently, they refer to parts of the referent of the definite DP without ever excluding that they actually refer to the whole referent. It should also be clear that given their maximality origin non-maximal definites cannot be used to encode proper partitivity.

If we assume that the above analysis is on the right track we face the question why non-maximal definites are preferred over full and bare partitives to express improper partitivity. Two hypotheses are available. The first is that full and bare partitives have proper partitivity encoded in their semantics and simply can't convey improper partitivity (see Zamparelli 1998, Barker 1998). The second is that full and bare partitives in principle encode improper partitivity but are outranked by non-maximal definites in expressing the latter for some reason yet to be specified. I will defend the second hypothesis.

3. Full partitives

Full partitives have received quite some attention in the formal semantics literature. Two questions seem to have driven most of the contributions:

(19) Why is it that indefinites are less felicitous than definites in the downstairs position of full partitives? (see De Hoop 1998 for an overview)

(20) Why is it that full partitives seem to encode proper and not improper partitivity? (Barker 1998, Zamparelli 1998)

I have nothing to add to the answers to the first question. I will simply restrict myself to discussing full partitives with a definite downstairs DP. As for the second question I do want to take position and claim that proper partitivity is not encoded in the semantics of full partitives. More precisely I claim that the default semantics of full partitives is that of improper partitivity. The initial motivation for this claim is the fact that encoding proper partitivity in the semantics leads to conceptual and empirical problems (see Le Bruyn 2007b).

In this section I will show that we can derive the inclination of full partitives towards proper partitivity without having to encode it in the semantics. All I need is the assumption that full partitives can encode both proper and improper partitivity. I take the more general improper partitive relation to be the default one:

| | |
|---|--------------------|
| (21) $\lambda z(\text{Books}(z))$ | books |
| $\lambda P \iota P$ | the |
| $\iota \lambda z(\text{Books}(z))$ | the books |
| $\lambda x \lambda y (\leq(y, x))$ | of |
| $\lambda y (\leq(y, \iota \lambda z(\text{Books}(z))))$ | of the books |
| $\lambda P \lambda Q \exists x (\text{three}(x) \& P(x) \& Q(x))$ | three |
| $\lambda Q \exists x (\text{three}(x) \& (\leq x, \iota \lambda z(\text{Books}(z)))) \& Q(x)$ | three of the books |

In section five I will show how we can establish that improper partitivity is indeed the default interpretation of full partitives.

3.1. Full partitives and the existential constraint

There is one aspect of full partitives that has not received a lot of attention – if any – in the literature. It concerns the fact that partitives assert existence of parts of an entity that is presupposed to exist.² *Three of the books* e.g. asserts that there exist three books of a set of books that is presupposed to exist. The reason why this is relevant is that asserting the existence of an entity that is presupposed to exist has been claimed to lead to pragmatic infelicity. Crucially, Barwise & Cooper (1981) claimed that the tautological nature of this kind of assertion is at the origin of the unacceptability of (existential) *there*-sentences with a definite DP:

(22) *There are the men.

For ease of exposition I introduce the following constraint:

(23) Existential constraint: Don't assert existence of (parts of) an entity that is presupposed to exist.

Expressions in which existence is asserted of (parts of) an entity that is presupposed to exist will accordingly be taken to violate this constraint. Given the semantics I proposed for non-maximal definites and full partitives the latter but not the former belong to this category.

3.2. Full partitives and non-maximal definites

In most formal frameworks constraints are strong in the sense that their violation leads to unacceptability. Given that full partitives violate the Existential constraint and non-maximal definites don't I would accordingly end up predicting that non-maximal definites are always to be preferred over full partitives. This is clearly not what I want. What I do want is for non-maximal definites to be preferred to express meanings they can express and full partitives to be preferred to express meanings non-maximal definites cannot express. Given that non-maximal definites can express improper but not proper partitivity (see section 2) this would lead to an analysis that predicts that non-maximal definites are preferred to express improper

² Note that this is not valid for all full partitives. Interestingly full partitives headed by *all* don't have this property. Their semantics is the following: $\lambda Q \forall x ((\leq x, \iota \lambda z(\text{N}(z))) \& Q(x))$. I will ignore *all* in what follows. Another kind of full partitives that does not have this property will be discussed in section 5.

partitivity and that full partitives are preferred to express proper partitivity. This would correctly derive the inclination of full partitives towards proper partitive readings. The way this can be implemented is by assuming that the Existential constraint is violable if a more important constraint is obeyed. One form this constraint could take is the following :

- (24) Proper partitivity constraint: If you want to express proper partitivity use an expression that is able to do so.

A formal framework that allows for violable constraints is Optimality Theory (OT). I will be using this framework because of this particular characteristic. In the following subsection I will work out an OT analysis.

3.3. Full partitives and non-maximal definites in OT

Up till now I have introduced two constraints, *viz.* the Existential constraint and the Proper partitivity constraint. In OT terms the first is a markedness and the second a faithfulness constraint. They will be abbreviated as *EXIST and FAITH PROP PART. The meanings we want to express are proper and improper partitivity. The forms we are comparing are the full partitive (# of the N) and non-maximal definites (the' N). The idea is to link meanings to the forms that express them best.

It is standard practice in OT to present the analysis in a tableau. The meaning to be expressed is put in the left upper box, the constraints to its right in order of decreasing importance, the competing forms beneath it. A * is used to indicate violation of a constraint. The form with the least violations of the most important constraints is the form that expresses the meaning best. It is indicated with ☞. The relevant OT tableaux look as follows:

(25)

| Improper partitivity | FAITH PROP PART | *EXIST |
|----------------------|-----------------|--------|
| ☞ The' N | | |
| # of the N | | * |

(26)

| Proper partitivity | FAITH PROP PART | *EXIST |
|--------------------|-----------------|--------|
| The' N | * | |
| ☞ # of the N | | * |

These tableaux are a formalization of the analysis I presented. The tableau in (25) tells us that non-maximal definites are preferred over full partitives to express improper partitivity. This is due to the fact that full partitives violate the Existential constraint whereas non-maximal definites don't. The tableau in (26) tells us that to express proper partitivity the full partitive is preferred over non-maximal definites. Even though full partitives violate the Existential constraint they can be preferred over non-maximal definites because the latter only allow to express improper partitivity.

3.5. Taking stock

In this section I showed that we can derive the inclination of full partitives towards proper partitivity even if we assume that their default interpretation is that of improper partitivity. The gist of the proposal is that in general non-maximal definites specialize in conveying improper partitivity and full partitives convey whatever is left, *viz.* proper partitivity. The reason why full partitives play a secondary role is that they violate the Existential constraint. One question that was not answered is how we can check that improper partitivity should be the default semantics of full partitives. This will be done in section 5. Another question that imposes itself is what is left for bare partitives to express if non-maximal definites specialize in improper partitivity and full partitives in proper partitivity. This question will be answered in the following section.

4. Bare partitives

Bare partitives are expressions of the form *of + definite determiner + Noun*. The semantics I propose is parallel to the one I propose for full partitives (see section 3):

| | |
|---|--------------|
| (27) $\lambda z(\text{Books}(z))$ | books |
| $\lambda P \iota P$ | the |
| $\iota \lambda z(\text{Books}(z))$ | the books |
| $\lambda x \lambda y (\leq(y, x))$ | of |
| $\lambda y (\leq(y, \iota \lambda z(\text{Books}(z))))$ | of the books |

There are two important differences. The first is that they lack an upstairs quantifier. The second is that bare partitives don't have intrinsic existential force. I assume that in this they are parallel to bare plurals and consequently share their distribution. Crucially they are then predicted to be unacceptable or at least infelicitous in subject position. I will therefore limit myself to the object position. Another important aspect of bare partitives is that – when used in a sentence – their semantics is the following:

| | |
|--|--------------|
| (28) $\lambda Q \exists y (\leq(y, \iota \lambda z(\text{Books}(z)))) \& Q(y)$ | of the books |
|--|--------------|

From this it follows that bare partitives violate the Existential constraint that was introduced in section 3.

Based on what precedes it is not difficult to establish which role bare partitives play within our competition set. First of all they only compete with non-maximal definites and full partitives in object position. Second, given that they violate the Existential constraint they can only be used to express proper partitivity. Third, because of the fact that they differ from full partitives in their lack of an upstairs quantifier they will be used when the speaker wants to stay neutral with respect to quantity. To formalize this I need an extra constraint of the following form:

| |
|--|
| (29) QUANTITY: Mark quantity if and only if in input. ³ |
|--|

³ In fact this is a combination of a faithfulness and a markedness constraint the former ranking over the latter. For expository reasons I combined them into one constraint.

Under the assumption that this constraint ranks above FAITH PROP PART and *EXIST I derive that :

- non-maximal definites are preferred over full and bare partitives to express improper partitivity
- full partitives are preferred over bare partitives and non-maximal definites to express proper partitivity whenever the input is not neutral with respect to quantity
- bare partitives are preferred over full partitives and non-maximal definites to express proper partitivity whenever the input is neutral with respect to quantity

The corresponding OT tableaux look as follows:

(30)

| Improper partitivity | QUANTITY | FAITH PROP PART | *EXIST |
|----------------------|----------|-----------------|--------|
| ☞ The' N | | | |
| # of the N | | | * |
| Of the N | | | * |

(31)

| Proper partitivity + # | QUANTITY | FAITH PROP PART | *EXIST |
|---------------------------|----------|-----------------|--------|
| The' N | * | * | |
| ☞ # of the N | | | * |
| Of the N | * | | * |

(32)

| Proper partitivity | *QUANTITY | FAITH PROP PART | *EXIST |
|--------------------|-----------|-----------------|--------|
| The' N | | * | |
| # of the N | * | | * |
| ☞ Of the N | | | * |

The above tableaux make no predictions about non-maximal definites or full partitives that were not explicitly treated in sections 2 and 3. The predictions about bare partitives however still need checking. One extra prediction will be introduced in section 5.

5. How to check whether partitives encode proper partitivity in their semantics ?

In this section I will show how we can check whether or not (full and bare) partitives encode proper partitivity in their semantics. The key lies in the above analysis according to which proper partitivity obtains via competition with non-maximal definites. It follows that if we can neutralize this competition we will have the possibility to check the default interpretation of (full and bare) partitives. Given that the competition originates in the fact that partitives

normally violate the Existential constraint I will present a context in which this constraint is not violated.

One way for partitives to circumvent the Existential constraint is for their downstairs DP to refer to (sub)kinds. Given that a kind doesn't carry the presupposition that it has instances in a given world this is exactly the context in which we expect partitives to show their true nature. In what follows I work out the necessary formal tools. I first define kinds using Chierchia's down operator:

- (33) $\hat{P} : (\text{For any situation/world } s) \lambda s \iota P_s \text{ if } \lambda s \iota P_s \text{ is in } K, \text{ undefined otherwise (} P_s \text{ is the extension of } P \text{ in } s)$

Kinds then receive the following definition:

- (34) The kind corresponding to a set P is \hat{P}

Subkinds are nothing more than a kind to which a contextual restriction has been added⁴:

- (35) $\hat{\lambda}x(P(x) \& C(x))$

The crucial question now is what it would mean for a partitive relation to be applied to kinds. Given that the down-operator can be seen as the intensional counterpart of the ι -operator we could imagine an intensional part-of operator that maps kinds to its atomic members in a world. One could in principle entertain two versions, one encoding proper partitivity and another encoding improper partitivity:

- (36) $\cup^1 d$: (Let d be a kind. For any world s) $\lambda x[x < d_s]$ if d_s is defined, where d_s is the plural individual that comprises all of the atomic members of the kind.

- (37) $\cup^2 d$: (Let d be a kind. For any world s) $\lambda x[x \leq d_s]$ if d_s is defined, where d_s is the plural individual that comprises all of the atomic members of the kind.

The first version predicts that partitives referring to all the atomic members of a kind should be infelicitous. The second version predicts that this shouldn't be a problem. In section 3 I claimed that the second version is the correct one.

In the following section I will check the predictions introduced in section 4 and in the present section.

6. Checking predictions

In this section I will check two predictions. The first is concerned with the role of bare partitives within our competition set. In section 4 I predicted that bare partitives are preferred over full partitives and non-maximal definites to express proper partitivity whenever the input

⁴ This is just one kind of subkind. To account for the subkind reading of indefinites one has to assume (see Dayal 2004) that next to the standard domain there exists a domain of subkinds. This kind of domain can however not be assumed to be underlying all subkind readings of demonstratives. The main problem this kind of analysis would have is to account for the fact that *those lions* can refer to one subkind of lions. (see Le Bruyn 2007a)

is neutral with respect to quantity. I therefore expect bare partitives to be acceptable under these circumstances. Let's take another look at the example I started out with:

(1) [When Aunt got ill Floddertje decided to make a nice pot of soup. She soon noticed that the soup got lumpy and saw no other solution than to take the mixer. You can imagine the consequences... Indeed : the soup got spread all over Aunt's kitchen and covered the nice white walls.]

Ondanks alle moeite die Floddertje deed om het geklieder op te kuisen
Despite all effort that Floddertje did to the mess up to clean
vond tante weken later nog steeds **van die soep** in alle hoeken van de
found aunt weeks later still still of that soup in all corners of the
keuken.
kitchen

'Despite all the effort Floddertje put into cleaning up the mess Aunt weeks later still found some of that soup in all corners of the kitchen.'⁵

Two aspects make *van die soep* acceptable in this example. The first is that *van die soep* cannot refer to all the soup Floddertje initially spread all over the kitchen (she cleaned part of it herself). This forces proper partitivity. The second is more subtle: when I claimed that bare partitives can be used when the speaker wants to stay neutral with respect to quantity this doesn't necessarily mean that whenever he wants to he can leave it out. Indeed, for a sentence containing a bare partitive to be felicitous it is necessary for it to be relevant without the need of specifying quantity. This is the case in (1) given that the fact that soup could still be found after two weeks seems relevant enough in itself. I predict that when we modify one of these aspects the example becomes infelicitous. (38) shows this for proper partitivity and (39) for quantity relevance.

(38) ?Floddertje was zo van slag dat tante uiteindelijk zelf van die
Floddertje was so off stroke that Aunt finally herself of that
soep moest opkuisen.
soup had clean

'Floddertje was so off her stroke that Aunt eventually had to clean up some of the soup herself.'

(39) ?Het was een enorme klus maar dezelfde dag nog kuiste Floddertje
It was a huge job but that same day still cleaned Floddertje
van die soep op.
of that soup up

'It was a huge job but the very same day Floddertje cleaned up some of that soup.'

There are a few verbs that seem to combine more freely with bare partitives in the sense that they don't need for the context to guarantee proper partitivity or relevance. Examples are given in (40) and (41):

⁵ I translated *van die soep* as *some that soup* to obtain an acceptable English translation. Note though that quantity is in fact underspecified.

(40) Ik heb van de kersen gegeten.
 I have of the cherries eaten
 'I ate some of the cherries.'

(41) Ik heb van die boeken verkocht.
 I have of those books sold
 'I sold some of those books.'

Interestingly the verbs concerned are exactly the once-only verbs discussed in section 2. I assume their once-only status is at the basis of their productive combination with bare partitives. The underlying idea is that they are more sensitive to the difference between proper and improper partitivity and therefore more easily allow for (bare) partitives.

The second prediction concerns the claim I made in section 3 and 4 concerning the improper partitive status of (full and bare) partitives. Based on the discussion in section 5 this claim predicts that partitives with a kind-referring downstairs DP should be able to refer to all the instances of the kind in a given world. That this is the case is shown for bare partitives in (42) and full partitives in (43).

(42) Gisteren zag ik van die gekke marsmannetjes in mijn tuin.
 Yesterday saw I of those crazy Martians in my garden
 Ze vertelden me dat ze de laatste overlevenden waren van
 They told me that they the last survivors were of
 hun beschaving.
 their civilization
 'Yesterday I saw some of those crazy Martians in my garden. They told me they were the last survivors of their civilization.'

(43) Gisteren zag ik drie van die gekke marsmannetjes in mijn tuin.
 Yesterday saw I three of those crazy Martians in my garden
 Ze vertelden me dat ze de laatste overlevenden waren van
 They told me that they the last survivors were of
 hun beschaving.
 their civilization
 'Yesterday I saw three of those funny Martians in my garden. They told me they were the last survivors of their civilization.'

Note that it is not a coincidence that I chose examples with a demonstrative DP. The reason for this is that these can refer to subkinds whereas DPs introduced by the definite article refer to kinds. Examples with the definite article would consequently be equivalent to simple bare plurals 'funny martians' (in the case of bare partitives) and simple DPs 'three funny martians' (in the case of full partitives). Standard economy considerations would rule these out.

7. Concluding remarks

In this paper I presented a competition analysis of three closely related expressions in Dutch : non-maximal definites, full partitives and bare partitives. This competition analysis led to interesting results two of which are a principled account of the distribution of bare partitives and a principled way of deriving the inclination towards proper partitivity of full and bare

partitives. Other aspects of the paper that are worth mentioning are the linguistic argument in favour of the sloppy maximality analysis of non-maximal definites and the semantic characterization of consumption and transaction verbs.

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